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ARTICULATING THE CUSTODY
THRESHOLD?
NEIL HUTTON*
I
INTRODUCTION
There is no provision for the suspension of a prison sentence in Scotland.
Courts have the option of either a custodial sentence or a community sanction.1
This article addresses the gray area between custody and community sanctions—
usually called the custody threshold.
When does an offense or a case become so serious that a custodial sentence
is necessary? Scholarship on the custody threshold has focused on the lack of
definitional clarity in statute and case law and has proposed a range of legal and
jurisprudential reforms. This article suggests that the custody threshold is a social
practice that distributes marginal cases to either custody or community sanctions.
Drawing on two empirical studies in Scotland, this article argues that the custody
threshold is produced by criminal justice professionals who share unarticulated
understandings of deserved punishments.
II
COMMUNITY SANCTIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CUSTODY
Like many other jurisdictions, Scotland has addressed the problem of overimprisonment by trying to encourage the courts to make greater use of
community sanctions. In the early 2000’s, during the first Scottish Parliament, the
Parliament’s Justice Committee published a report expressing concern at the
ineffectiveness of short prison sentences.2 The report reflected the evidence
submitted to the review from a wide range of organizations and individuals and
made a number of recommendations for reform.3 Although no legislation
emerged directly from this review, the proportionate use of community sanctions
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1. A custodial sentence is a sentence imposing imprisonment. A community sanction is an order
consisting of community service, required treatment, required classes, or another non-custodial
obligation.
2. JUSTICE 1 COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY, VOL. 1 (2003).
3. Neil Hutton, Toward a Sentencing Policy for the Use of Short Prison Sentences in Scotland, 4
JURIDICAL REV. 313, 313–14 (2003) (stating that many parties, like the Scottish Consortium on Crime
and Criminal Justice and Criminal Justice Forum, submitted evidence to the Justice 1 Committee
expressing concern about the “limited effectiveness of short prison sentences” and that the report made
“many recommendations, intended to increase the use of non-custodial sentences as alternatives”).
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has increased steadily.4 In 2008, for the first time, the proportionate use of
community sanctions exceeded the proportionate use of imprisonment.5 This
trend has continued.6 In 2008–09, custodial sentences accounted for 13% of
penalties passed by Scottish Courts, and community sanctions for 14%.7 In 2015–
16, custodial sentences accounted for 14% of penalties and community sanctions
for 19%.8 So, although there has been a steady growth in the use of community
sentences, the proportionate use of imprisonment by the courts has remained
steady. Despite increases in community sentences, persuading those involved in
sentencing decisions to use community sanctions as a direct alternative to short
custodial sentences remains challenging. How can the custody threshold be
shifted upwards?
The most recent attempt by the Scottish Government to reduce imprisonment
was contained in the Criminal Justice and Licensing Act.9 The Act introduced a
statutory presumption against the use of custodial sentences of three months or
less;10 and the Act introduced a new community sanction, the Community
Payback Order, that combined the punitive or reparative requirement of unpaid
work, or both, with a range of other requirements designed to reduce illegal
behavior.11 The Scottish Government published an evaluation of these reforms
in March, 2015.12

4. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, SCOTTISH GOV’T, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN
SCOTLAND,
2016–2017
59
(2017),
https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00532010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BGR8-J6WN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (showing, in Table 7(b), a proportional increase
in community sentencing from 2007–08 to 2016–17).
5. Id. (showing in Table 7(b) the Community Sentence proportion of 14% exceeding the 13%
Custody proportion in 2008).
6. Id. (showing in Table 7(b) that the Community Sentence proportion has exceeded the Custody
proportion for every year in the report since 2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, (ASP 13) § 17 (“A court must not pass
a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 3 months or less on a person unless . . . no other method is
appropriate.”).
10. Id.
11. See id. at § 14.
12. SCOTTISH GOV’T SOCIAL RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY PAYBACK ORDERS,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOCIAL WORK REPORTS AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST SHORT SENTENCES
(2015) [hereinafter SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION].
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Table 1: Prison Sentences of up to Two Years Imposed in the Scottish Courts,
2010–2015 13
Total

From 3 months to less From 6 months to
than 6 months
less than 2 years
n
% of total
n
% of total

15256

Less than 3
months
n % of
total
5324 35

5220

34

3436

23

15874

4516

28

6149

39

3908

25

14748

4334

29

5470

37

3804

26

14,079 4,126

29

5,214

37

3,539

25

13,977 4,092

29

5,225

37

3,587

26

13,724 4,066

30

4,850

35

3,730

27

n

2010–
2011
2011–
2012
2012–
2013
2013–
2014
2014–
2015
2015–
2016

The use of sentences of less than three months declined initially, but the use
of sentences between three and six months, and between six months and two
years both increased.14 This pattern is consistent with longer-term trends that predate the reforms, but it appears likely that at least some sheriffs have imposed
longer sentences as a result of the presumption against sentences of less than
three months.15 In any event, it seems clear that the reforms have not entirely
shifted sentencing practices away from short prison sentences to community
sanctions.16 This suggests that the custody threshold remains stubborn and very
difficult to shift.
Maybe the problem has something to do with the concept of the custody

13. This exhibit is comprised of data pulled from tables published Dec. 2011, Nov. 2012, Nov. 2013,
Dec. 2014, Feb. 2016, and Jan. 2017, available at the listed URL. SCOTTISH GOV’T, DATASETS –
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND, https://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/CrimeJustice/Datasets/DatasetsCrimProc [https://perma.cc/7XND-4EGX] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
14. See id.
15. See id. (showing that after the implementation of the presumption against three-month
sentences, sentences greater than 3 months increased, while sentences of less than 3 months decreased).
16. See id. (showing the aggregate shift of sentences from less than three months to those greater
than three months after the implementation of the statutory presumption); OFFICE FOR NATIONAL
STATISTICS, SCOTTISH GOV’T, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND, 2016–2017 59 (2017),
https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00532010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU3E-CCH9] (last visited Oct. 2,
2018) (showing that the percentage of custodies compared to all penalties has remained roughly static
despite the increase in community sanctions).
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threshold itself. Von Hirsch and Ashworth have argued that the concept needs
to be defined more clearly and precisely.17 Padfield has argued that the concept
of the custody threshold has itself hindered the greater use of community
sanctions as a replacement for short prison sentences.18 She suggests that the term
should be abandoned.19 This article takes another look at the concept of the
custody threshold. What does this idea of a custody threshold mean in practice?
What does the use of custody as a last resort mean to judges? Why is it so difficult
to shift sentencing practices from custody to the community?
III
THE CUSTODY THRESHOLD
Padfield locates the origins of the custody threshold concept in English and
Welsh legal discourse.20 The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 set out a principled
approach to sentencing.21 Proportionality was to be the primary rationale for
sentencing; sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.22
Other aims of sentencing, such as deterrence, incapacitation, or reform, could
continue to be pursued but only within the limits set by the principle of
proportionality.23 Commenting on the Act, Ashworth and Von Hirsch argued
that sanctions should be seen as stacked in a pyramid, with thresholds that would
have to be crossed to move from one type of sanction to another.24 The custody
threshold was one of these thresholds.
The concept of a custody threshold refers to a notional line in the sand. On
one side lie sentences of imprisonment, on the other, community sanctions. While
there are notional thresholds for both financial penalties and community
sanctions, there is something distinctive about the custody threshold. A custodial
sentence has some characteristics that differentiate it from a community
sentence. Most importantly, it imposes unavoidable consequences. A custodial
sanction deprives offenders of their liberty and excludes them from society.
Contained in prison, the prisoner cannot avoid the consequences of the sanction.
A community order may impose restrictions on liberty and require the
performance of particular tasks, but offenders may choose not to comply with
17. Andrew Ashworth & Andrew Von Hirsch, Recognising Elephants: The Problem of the Custody
Threshold, CRIM. L. REV. 187, 199–200 (1997) (critiquing the pre-Criminal Justice and Licensing Act
judicial approach to the custody threshold).
18. Nicola Padfield, Time to Bury the Custody “Threshold”?, CRIM. L. REV. 593, 610 (2011).
19. Id. at 611–12.
20. Id. at 593–99.
21. See Criminal Justice Act 1991, c. 53, § 1(2) (UK) (repealed 2000) (“[T]he court shall not pass a
custodial sentence on the offender unless . . . the offence . . . was so serious that only such a sentence can
be justified for the offence; or . . . the offence is a violent or sexual offence, that only such a sentence
would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from him.”).
22. Id. at § 2(2)(a).
23. Padfield, supra note 18 (quoting Andrew Von Hirsh & Martin Wasik, Section 29 Revised:
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1994)).
24. Ashworth & Von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 197.
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these requirements, albeit that monitoring procedures will call them to account
and impose further sanctions. The consequences of a prison sentence are
unavoidable. This may seem obvious, but the difference may help us understand
more about how criminal justice actors conceive of the custody threshold.
A. Defining the Custody Threshold
The term “custody threshold” has become widespread in both court
judgments and academic writing.25 It has also been used in sentencing guidelines
published by the Sentencing Guidelines Council and its successor, the Sentencing
Council.26 The 2004 guideline states that custody is to be reserved for the most
serious offenses.27 However, if the custody threshold has been crossed, the court
should consider whether there are mitigating factors and only pass a custodial
sanction if it is unavoidable.28
The custody threshold has also been incorporated into a number of
Magistrates’ Courts’ guidelines. For example, the guideline on assault states that
“[w]hen sentencing . . . offences, the court should also consider the custody
threshold.”29 Specifically, the court should consider whether the custody
threshold has been passed, whether the imposition of a custodial sentence is
unavoidable, and whether the sentence can be suspended.”30 The guidelines on
handling goods and shop theft state that a persistent criminal record may cause
the custody threshold to be crossed even though the seriousness of the offense
alone might place the case below the custody threshold.31
Padfield argues that attempts to define the custody threshold in caselaw and
guidelines are insufficiently precise.32 Cases straddle the threshold, and decisions
about whether custody or community sanctions are appropriate remain opaque
and overly subjective.33 Padfield argues that Court of Appeal decisions have not
been helpful; “[a]ny number of practical examples could be offered from the case
law to illustrate how little assistance is gained from the concept of the ‘custody
threshold.’ . . . The precise position of the ‘threshold’ continues to confuse,
because there is no such precise line.” 34 Padfield complains that there is no
objective legal definition of the custody threshold that can be operationalized.35
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Padfield, supra note 18, at 593.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
SENTENCING COUNCIL, MAGISTRATES’ COURT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, COMMON
ASSAULT/RACIALLY
OR
RELIGIOUSLY
AGGRAVATED
COMMON
ASSAULT
(2018),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/item/common-assault-racially-religiously-aggravatedcommon-assault/ [https://perma.cc/FG6E-LGRP].
30. Id.
31. Padfield, supra note 18, at 601.
32. Id. at 600.
33. Id. at 600–02.
34. Id. at 604.
35. Id. at 610 (“It is submitted that the ‘threshold’ does not help decide hard cases.”).
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This may well be the case, but in the daily practice of the courts, offenders are
sent to prison for short sentences because the threshold has ostensibly been
crossed. The custody threshold may be vague but, at the same time, it is real and
has significant practical consequences.
Statutes also provide an extremely vague definition of the custody threshold.36
Although the courts have adopted the term and used it frequently, this has not
clarified the definition.
Roberts and Harris have recently proposed a four step methodology for
decisions about the custody threshold.37 Step One reviews the harm and
culpability of the offense to measure seriousness in line with the primary principle
of proportionality.38 Only when the offense is so serious that only a custodial
sentence is appropriate will the custody threshold be deemed to have been
crossed. Step Two considers aggravating and mitigating factors, including the
absence of a criminal record, which is known as first offender mitigation.39 After
Steps One and Two, the court resolves whether the sentence is custodial or noncustodial; Steps Three and Four only “extend the term of custody or enhance the
punitiveness of the non-custodial sanction.”40 Step Three takes account of the
criminal record of the accused. Step Four discounts for a plea of guilty.41 Roberts
and Harris argue that neither Step Three nor Step Four should be allowed to shift
an offense across the threshold.42 The presence of a criminal record should only
alter the severity of the custodial or community sanction.43 This is a significant
change. Although it is not possible to provide exact quantitative evidence,
Roberts and Harris argue that, from an analysis of theft sentencing, it seems
highly likely that a significant proportion of offenders convicted of relatively less
serious theft offenses receive a custodial sentence because of their criminal
record.44 A discount for a plea of guilty, having nothing to do with the
proportionate seriousness of the offense, should also not bring a case below the
custody threshold, but only reduce the severity of the custodial sentence within
the guideline range.45
B. Case or Offense?
Crossing the custody threshold requires an offense to reach a particular level

36. See id. at 604 (“[I]t is enough to suggest that the concept of ‘custody threshold’ does not appear
to offer sentencers clarity or help.”).
37. Julian V. Roberts & Lyndon Harris, Reconceptualising the Custody Threshold in England and
Wales, 28 CRIM. L. F. 477, 496 (2017).
38. Id. at 497.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 497–98.
42. Id. at 498.
43. Id. at 497–98.
44. Id. at 491–92.
45. Id. at 497–98.
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of seriousness. One of the issues identified by Padfield46 and more recently by
Roberts and Harris47 is that it is not clear whether the custody threshold is
properly defined in terms of the seriousness of the offense or in terms of the
seriousness of the case as a whole. For desert theorists, seriousness is defined by
the harm caused and the degree of culpability of the offender.48 Thus, the criminal
record of the offender should, strictly speaking, not form part of the assessment
of the seriousness of the offense. In practice, however, the offender’s criminal
record will almost always factor into the seriousness of the offense.49 Thinking of
the custody threshold as a line in the sand defined by only the seriousness of the
specific offense is thus unlikely to be a realistic approach.
In R. v. Bradbourn, Lawton L.J. famously argued that the “courts can
recognise an elephant when they see one, but may not find it necessary to define
it.”50 In response, Von Hirsch and Ashworth set out a case for a more principled
definition of the “elephant” that is the custody threshold.51 They argue that
assessing seriousness is an unavoidably comparative process.52 Cases are more or
less serious than other cases. Treating cases as unique and deciding each case on
its own facts and circumstances leads to “virtually unreviewable discretion.”53
They instead suggest following the existing practice of the Court of Appeal by
thinking about “standard cases.”54 A standard drug case might be characterized
by the amount of drugs, a rape case by the presence of a shared set of common
factors, et cetera.55 The court then examines the case at hand to assess whether
the case is more or less serious than the standard case by considering aggravating
and mitigating factors relating to the offense and the offender.56 In assessing
whether a case crosses the custody threshold, Von Hirsch and Ashworth argue
that the custody threshold “ought to operate chiefly to keep cases out of custody
unless there are aggravating factors that take a case above the threshold.”57 They
give examples of cases of property offending, burglary (housebreaking), and also
less serious sexual offenses that they argue should normally, that is in standard

46. See Padfield, supra note 18, at 611 (suggesting that judges do not rely on fixed ideas of
seriousness of offenses that cross the threshold because the threshold is unclear, but instead judges rely
on the specific factors of the case).
47. Roberts & Harris, supra note 37, at 488.
48. See id. at 489 (stating that the statutory definition of seriousness of the offense focuses on
culpability and harm and that the statutory definition reflects a desert-based approach).
49. See id. at 490 (explaining that in some criminal cases, the gravity of the offender’s crime is
insufficient to move the case across the custody threshold, but consideration of his prior convictions leads
to a custodial sentence anyway).
50. R. v. Bradbourn (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S) 180, 182.
51. Ashworth & Von Hirsch, supra note 37.
52. Id. at 192–93.
53. Id. at 193.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 198.
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cases, not cross the custody threshold without the presence of significant
aggravating factors.58
IV
THE CUSTODY THRESHOLD IN SCOTLAND
There has been little academic attention given to the concept of a custody
threshold in Scotland. However, although the concept is not commonly studied,
the issues about how to define the boundary between custodial and community
sanctions remains relevant. In Scotland “[a] court must not pass a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of 3 months or less on a person unless the court
considers that no other method of dealing with the person is appropriate.”59
Custody is thus the sanction of last resort. There is, however, little jurisprudence
attempting to define what the last resort means in practice. The definition is not
based on offense seriousness alone. The focus is on the appropriateness of the
sanction, but for what purpose or purposes? There is no statutory statement of
sentencing purposes in Scots law, although the familiar purposes of retribution,
rehabilitation, protection of the public, reparation, and others are generally held
to serve as appropriate justifications for sentencing.
A. The Custody Threshold as a Shared Justice System Cultural Understanding
Studies in England and Wales and in Scotland involved reporting the findings
of interviews with individual judges about their perceptions of the custody
threshold.60 Both studies found that judges claimed to use custody only as a last
resort when cases were so serious that no other sanction was suitable.61 The term
custody threshold thus appears to refer to a notional stage in the sentencing
decision-making process when the sentencer somehow becomes aware that a
custodial sentence may be unavoidable. This conception is based on a particular
way of thinking about the sentencer decision-making process. Sentencing is
conceived as a decision made by an individual judge who deploys cognitive
processes in unspecified ways to analyze the facts and circumstances of the case.
I have recently argued elsewhere that sentencing should be understood as a
process involving a number of criminal justice actors and not just individual
judges.62 Judges formally make the authoritative decision in court, but that does
not mean that they can be held solely responsible for the series of practices by
criminal justice actors that contribute to a final sentencing decision. This is not to

58. Id. at 198–99.
59. Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, (ASP 13) § 17.
60. Andrew Millie et al., Borderline Sentencing: A Comparison of Sentencers’ Decision Making in
England and Wales, and Scotland, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 243, 251–54 (2007); Jacqueline Tombs
& Elizabeth Jagger, Denying Responsibility, 46 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 803, 814–818 (2006).
61. Id. at 819.
62. Neil Hutton, Visible and Invisible Sentencing, in MODERNISATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CHAIN AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 145 (Annie Hondeghem et al. eds., 2016).
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argue that judges play no part in the decision-making, nor that judges do not
exercise discretion. However, they do so as one of a number of actors engaged in
generating sentencing decisions, not as the sole decision-makers. Sentencing
decision-making should not therefore be conceived of as a series of cognitive
functions performed by an individual judge.
In particular, social workers writing pre-sentence reports play an important
role in sentencing.63 The responsibility for presenting Community Payback
Orders and Restriction of Liberty Orders at sentencing options rests with social
workers. They are responsible for presenting the court with sentencing options.
While social workers do not normally recommend a sentence, as this is seen as a
formal judicial function, they clearly play an important role in sentencing. For
instance, one sheriff interviewed stated:
You can defer sentence for good behaviour for a person for a short while, with a bad
record, and say, ‘Well, if you are of good behaviour, I may consider a CPO’. If he comes
back, and has been of good behaviour. . . but if the criminal justice team come back and
say, ‘No. We can’t actually work with this man,’ then . . . there’s very little to go on.64

Research on writing social enquiry reports suggested that social workers are
well aware that they are not supposed to recommend a sentence but are often
very careful in their use of language to try to communicate their preference for
an option without an overt recommendation. Equally, social workers can also use
language to suggest to the court that there is no viable community sanction
available, which is a euphemistic way of recognizing that a short custodial
sentence appears inevitable.65
Report writers therefore play an important role in identifying the custody
threshold; it is not only a judicial task. Report writers experience tension between
their professional commitment to the welfare of their clients and their role as
providers of information to the court. This can usefully be understood as a form
of “edgework.”66 In the absence of any rules specifying the criteria that lead to
either a community sanction or a custodial sentence, report writers are sometimes
unsure whether the court will perceive a community sanction as realistic.67 An
element of risk-taking is unavoidable; yet, the desire to achieve the best outcome
for their client might compromise report writers’ reputation in the eyes of the

63. See id. at 149 (“The account provided [by the social worker] in the [pre-sentencing report]
performs a significant part of the work of sentencing. It is a further translation of the prosecution case
into a . . . relatively narrow range of potential sentencing outcomes.”).
64. SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 128 (quoting a Sheriff Judge
interview).
65. See Fergus McNeill et al., Risk, Responsibility and Reconfiguration: Penal Adaptation and
Misadaptation, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 419, 428 (2009).
66. Anne Worrall, Grace under Pressure: The Role of Courage in the Future of Probation Work, 54
HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 508, 512 (2015).
67. Cf. Simon Halliday et al., Shadow Writing and Participant Observation: A Study of Criminal
Justice Social Work Around Sentencing, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y 189 (2008) (“By developing a reasonably
coherent narrative about the offender they attempted to lead the judge as reader to the narrative’s logical
conclusion.”).
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court. Experienced social workers thus develop a sense of what the custody
threshold means in practice that, it seems, is broadly shared by judges and other
regular court actors. Hawkins68 describes this unarticulated, unthinking
professional knowledge as “mutuality”; Bourdieu69 describes it as “habitus.”
Worrall argues that probation workers share an occupational culture that
includes shared values and a sense of “how things are done around here.”70 The
work by Halliday, et al. provides some evidence that a common working culture
is shared by different professionals working in the criminal justice system.71
Although social workers and judges may have competing interests and
viewpoints, each party considers the other party’s perceptions and seeks to reach
an outcome consistent with their common understanding of the overall criminal
justice system.
I think there’s . . . traditionally been a disparity in approach. Social Workers think
Sheriffs want to send people into prison, and Sheriffs think Social Workers will say
anything to keep them out of prison. And so you . . . go in with that allowance
perhaps. . . . So you have a slightly different reference point, but, again, you take that
on board and you carry on. It doesn’t mean you can’t come to a view. It’s just a factor
in the whole decision-making process.72

Sudnow described the “institutionalized . . . common orientation [towards]
allowable reductions” that developed between district attorneys and defense
lawyers to facilitate plea bargaining.73 Sudnow’s practitioners share broad
narratives of “typical” cases—those with which they deal in some quantity day
after day.74 While practitioners will say that they “know” what these typical cases
are, they are not able to provide objective definitions of typical cases. Thus,
within these typifications, there is a scope of variation. It is often easier to identify
an unusual case than to accurately define a typical case. As Sudnow points out,
the cases that cause difficulty do not fit a type or occur so rarely that there is
insufficient data to construct typifications.75 Sheriffs, social workers, and other
68. See Keith Hawkins, Order, Rationality and Silence: Some Reflections on Criminal Justice
Decision-Making, in EXERCISING DISCRETION: DECISION-MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND BEYOND 186 (Loraine Gelsthorpe & Nicola Padfield eds., 2003).
69. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 72 (1977) (“The structures
constitutive of a particular type of environment . . . produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable
dispositions . . . objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and . . . collectively orchestrated without
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.”).
70. Worrall, supra note 66, at 514.
71. See Halliday, supra note 67, at 212 (concluding that social workers acted with professional
sentencing judgment, typically only expected of judges, beyond their regulatory responsibilities within
the criminal justice system by developing influential reports for the judges to understand “the basic thrust
of a social worker’s narrative”).
72. SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 131 (quoting a Sheriff Judge
interview).
73. David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender
Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 258 (1965).
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id. at 261.
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court practitioners share an understanding of typical cases where, although the
seriousness of the offense does not appear on its face to require a custodial
sentence, other considerations such as criminal record, homelessness, or
substance abuse mean that a custodial sentence is unavoidable.
The traditional judicial account of individualized sentencing conceives of a
judge attaching notional weights to facts and circumstances, both aggravating and
mitigating, and drawing up a balance sheet that ascribes a measure of seriousness
to the case and thus indicates the appropriate sanction. On this account, the
custody threshold is crossed when this series of imaginary calculations produces
the appropriate level of seriousness. While this makes logical sense, it remains an
untested hypothesis based on the assumption that sentencing decision-making
can be characterized as a series of cognitive processes undertaken by an
individual actor. The difficulty is that researchers have no access to these internal
processes. Nor are there visible traces of these practices. Researchers can ask
judges to describe how they reached their decisions, but they cannot directly trace
the processes through which the decision was made and measure the relative
impact of various factors on the final outcome. This is one explanation for the
difficulty in articulating what exactly is meant by the custody threshold. From a
legal perspective, Padfield has reached a similar conclusion.76 Padfield argues that
the courts have explicitly avoided providing an objective definition of the custody
threshold and thus it is time to stop using the concept.77 It may well be impossible
to provide an objective or legal definition of the custody threshold. However, that
does not mean that the term has no significance in sentencing practice or in the
perceptions of criminal justice actors.
The idea of a threshold that must be crossed appeals to a common sense idea
of sentencing. We imagine a scale of seriousness where, at some point on this
scale, a custodial sanction becomes the only appropriate sanction (at least
according to the legislative definition).
My argument here is that the custody threshold is more helpfully
conceptualized as a shared cultural understanding, rather than a point on a scale.
Criminal justice actors share an understanding of various types of case that
require a custodial sanction, even though the headline offense in itself would
generally be insufficiently serious to require custody. These cases fit somewhere
in between a set of cases for which custody is inevitable—and any questions are
about the length of prison sentence—and a set of cases where custody would
normally be seen as inappropriate and unnecessary. The problem with a cultural
understanding is that it is not explicit; it is performed through the actions of court
practitioners but it is not defined or articulated. Providing an objective definition
of any of these typical case is difficult, arguably impossible, however the custody
threshold is performed daily in the practices of courtroom actors. So, while the
custody threshold might be difficult to define objectively, it is a performed reality.
76. Padfield, supra note 18, at 610–12.
77. Id. at 612.
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The challenge is to find a way of articulating the shared cultural understanding
of the threshold.
The argument here is that court practitioners share a broad understanding of
cases that require a short prison sentence. There will not be complete agreement
between practitioners. The relative impact of the practices of different
professionals on the production of custody threshold decisions is, of course, an
empirical question. Stunz has argued that, in the United States of America,
prosecutors often have a more significant impact on sentencing practices than
judges.78 The evidence from the empirical studies here suggests that, in Scotland
too, the charging decisions of the Crown play an important part in framing cases
on one side or the other of the custody threshold.79
There will be differences in judgment about whether a particular case fits or
does not fit the typical case, but this does not challenge the existence of a broadly
shared understanding. As Hough et al. note,
It was evident from the ways in which the sentencers described their cusp cases that
sentencing is not so much a technical or value-neutral process as a value-laden process
of constructing and exploring the narratives of the lives of the people in the dock.80

Judges interviewed in a study evaluating the introduction of the Community
Payback Order were reluctant to define the “custody threshold” but were able
and willing to reflect on what it meant in practice.81 In one recurring type of case,
custody was thought to be unavoidable because of the criminal record of the
offender and, in particular, because of repeated failure to comply with the
requirements of a community sanction.82 Judges felt that they had to be
concerned about compliance. Judges saw the persistent breach of community
sanctions as something that should not be tolerated.83 The public had a right to
expect that an order of the court would be carried out and that there would be
consequences for breach of requirements.84 For some judges, this was also a
matter of asserting the authority of both the court and their personal judicial
authority. For others, this was a matter of ensuring efficient use of public
resources. It was seen as wasteful to place an offender on a community order
where there was little chance of compliance. This was not just a judicial

78. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 595–
99 (2001).
79. See JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 595–99
(1995) (discussing research that found that the charge prosecutors presented to magistrates often affected
their sentencing practice).
80. MIKE HOUGH ET AL., THE DECISION TO IMPRISON: SENTENCING AND THE PRISON
POPULATION 39 (2003).
81. Cf. SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 141–42 (“Although there
was consensus that a custodial sentence remains a ‘last resort’, there is clearly variation in when Sheriffs
consider that threshold to have been crossed.”).
82. See id. at 128–29.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 132.
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perspective but one shared by social workers.85 Based on the social workers’
practices of reporting pervasive non-compliers to judges for further action, there
may be little to be gained by recommending a community sanction for an
offender who had demonstrated a repeated inability to comply and where there
had been no change in circumstances to suggest that a change in behavior was
likely.86
Breaches were classified into two main categories: willful non-compliance and
feckless non-compliance, but both categories would normally result in a custodial
sentence.87 Willful non-compliers were typically young men who chose not to
comply with requirements despite being given additional chances to do so. The
court eventually ran out of patience with offenders who failed to comply. Of
course, some judges had more patience than others. One Sheriff noted:
I impose a sentence that I think is apt for the individual offender in the circumstances
of the crime in the particular moment that I impose it. And if you have somebody who
has committed even a relatively minor offence, and has been given three opportunities
to do something else, and has not done it, then you have to sanction them in a way that
has an impact upon them and on others who might be in that situation. And that doesn’t
justify sending that individual to prison for six months or more because I’m told that a
short sentence has no impact. I’m not at that stage trying to engage in the process of
rehabilitation . . . I’m saying, ‘You were told to do a variety of other things as an option.
You have not done it. Here is the inevitable consequence.’88

The feckless non-compliers are typically offenders with chaotic lives, which
might include homelessness, drug or alcohol addictions, mental health problems,
or lack of intimate relationships or community ties.89
[I]f you’ve got people with a transient lifestyle, and we know from history they’re not
going to be able to respond to a community-based disposal, and . . . the agents are
generally inviting you to take the view of ‘there’s nothing else we can do.’ . . . That’s
where a short sentence comes in . . . .90

These offenders were seen not as deliberately choosing to fail to comply with
requirements, but as being unable to comply.91 They are seen as lacking control
of their lives. A community payback order is therefore inappropriate because it
is wasteful. The risk of non-compliance is very high and the consequence is

85. See id. at 110 (stating that judges needed to have confidence in social workers reporting
breaching people when necessary and that social workers felt “pressure to be seen as tough on noncompliance”).
86. Cf. id. (indicating that social workers would report breaches non-compliers to the court when a
continued pattern of refusals to comply signaled that compliance was not possible and warranted “more
decisive action” by the court against the non-compliers).
87. See id. at 129.
88. Id. (quoting a Sheriff Judge interview).
89. Id. (stating that Sheriffs gave examples of serial non-compliance “rooted in complex and
overlapping individual problems” instead of willful non-compliance and that, despite greater sympathy
for the non-compliant party, the short prison sentence is “inevitable” and even “beneficial in the absence
of appropriate facilities elsewhere”).
90. Id.
91. Id. (stating that the serial non-compliance was “rooted in complex and overlapping individual
problems, such as homelessness, mental ill-health and alcoholism” that prevented compliance).
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significant extra work for CPO supervisors, social workers, and the court, which
could and should be avoided.
Although custody is seen as a last resort for both willful and feckless noncompliers, the rationale is very different for each.
A social worker might write a Criminal Justice Social Work Report
suggesting that despite a poor record of compliance with previous community
orders, an offender has presented evidence of a new relationship that gives cause
to think that the offender is now likely to comply with the requirements of a
community order.
If you see somebody in that context saying, ‘Yes, we know all of this. We know about
all of these breaches, but . . .’ And sometimes it can be for all sorts of reasons. It can be
they’ve done a little bit and they’ve got contact with their family member, they’ve got
contact with their child again, they’ve got some other . . . something.92

However, another judge may consider that, notwithstanding the evidence for
potential change, the record of breach is too serious to risk another community
order. Judges hold different views on the extent to which the judicial role is to
enforce compliance or to take what is presented as an opportunity to pursue
desistance.
Some sheriffs . . . I think feel much more responsibility or have much more of a . . . not
a feeling that they’re actually a social worker, but a feeling they’re part of that process;
whereas other sheriffs feel that they’re not part of that process, that they’re part of a
different process.93

B. Sheriff Court Pilot Study
While data on sentencers’ perceptions of the custody threshold shed some
light on the nature of the custody threshold, it would be helpful to have more
data on the cases that receive short prison sentences. Unfortunately, published
court statistics are not very helpful because they link sentence with principal
offense, but not with criminal record nor with other information about an
offender contained in a Criminal Justice Social Work Report. However there was
a recent, small study in a Scottish Sheriff Court that provides some useful
insights.94 The research was conducted by the court to provide information for
the Judicial Institute and has not been published.
Sheriffs in the study were asked to complete a form for each case where they
imposed a prison sentence of less than twelve months. The form was a single page
and contained information about the gender of the offender, the length of
sentence(s), and the sentencing discount that was granted where relevant. Judges
were also asked to list their reasons for using a custodial sentence, in order of
importance. There were five options, and judges were asked to list all that were
relevant. The provided options were (1) not likely to comply with non-custodial
92. Id. at 128.
93. Id. at 131 (quoting a Sheriff judge interview).
94. Neil Hutton, Sheriff Court Pilot Study (Sep. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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sentence; (2) accused’s previous convictions; (3) incarceration necessary to
protect the public; (4) suitable community sentence not available; and (5) other
factors considered by the sentencing judge.95
There were 31 cases in the two-month period of the research. Just under half
the offenders were already serving prison sentences; fourteen of the offenders
were in prison or on license.96 These offenders were being sentenced for offenses
committed before they entered prison to serve their current sentence. If an
offender is already in prison, a community sentence is not an option. The court
will almost always impose a custodial sentence to run consecutively after the end
of the current sentence or, more commonly, to run concurrently alongside the
current sentence. The assumption shared by most regular court practitioners
would be that a prison sentence is highly likely for offenders who are appearing
from prison.
A further six offenders were in breach of a court order; one case was a CPO
and the others were bail orders.97 Where an offender has a significant criminal
record, custody is highly likely.
Of the remaining 11 cases, most were for multiple offenses rather than a single
offense.98 In all of these cases, except in the case involving drug production,
criminal records were listed by the sentencing judge as a reason for custody
(usually alongside other reasons).99
It is difficult to summarize from such a small sample, but one striking factor
is the high proportion of offenders being sentenced who are already serving a
prison sentence or are in breach of a bail order. In the remainder of the cases,
judges identified the presence of criminal record as a reason for the imposition
of a custodial sentence.100 None of this will come as a surprise to anyone familiar
with the work of the summary courts.
The findings provide some support for the interview data. Courts resort to the
use of short prison sentences in cases where the offender has a significant criminal
record, much of which relates to non-compliance with various orders of the court.
Many of these offenders will also have other challenges, mental health issues,
alcohol or drug misuse, unstable accommodation, unemployment, et cetera.101
They find themselves caught up in the criminal justice system that is not designed
to provide the sorts of welfare provisions that many would argue these offenders
need.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 129 (“Sheriffs gave
examples of serial non-compliance rooted in complex and overlapping individual problems, such as
homelessness, mental ill-health and alcoholism. . . . [A] short prison sentence can not only come to be
seen as inevitable, but even beneficial in the absence of appropriate facilities elsewhere.”).

1 - HUTTON - CUSTODY THRESHOLD (DO NOT DELETE)

16

2/14/2019 2:16 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 82: 1

In the criminal court, there comes a time when an unavoidable consequence
is seen as necessary. For many of these cases, the seriousness of the offense alone
would not require a custodial sentence. Defining the custody threshold in terms
of offense seriousness is thus unlikely to have much impact on sentencing
practice.
V
CONCLUSION
Regular summary court practitioners share an unarticulated understanding of
what the custody threshold means in practice. The question is: what is the most
appropriate way to articulate the custody threshold? It might be that there are
too many subjective judgments involved across too many factors to allow courts
to provide generally applicable descriptions of the threshold. However it is still
both possible and desirable to provide more useful accounts of when short prison
sentences are necessary for particular sorts of cases. Rather than drop the term
custody threshold, sentencing policy should articulate it more clearly.
The Scottish Government is currently considering raising the presumption
against short sentences from three months to twelve months.102 This might be
taken as a clear indication of the government’s desire to reduce the prison
population in Scotland. It is difficult to predict the impact this will have on
sentencing practices. It is unlikely to address the perceived need for a custodial
sentence in certain cases. The government should ask the Scottish Sentencing
Council to consider developing a guideline to articulate the custody threshold.
This would raise the interesting issue of whether defining the custody threshold
should be seen as an attempt to formalize existing practices or develop a new
policy designed to change existing practices.

102. SCOTTISH GOV’T, DELIVERING FOR TODAY, INVESTING FOR TOMORROW: THE
GOVERNMENT’S PROGRAMME FOR SCOTLAND 2018–19 17 (2018) (“In the year ahead the presumption
against short sentences will be extended to 12 months, once additional safeguards for victims in the
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 are in force. We will issue revised guidance and provide additional
funding for supervised and supported bail to ensure that remand is only used where necessary and
appropriate.”).

